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The case of Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka
Specially Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 288 (C. C. of A.) presents a new and
novel aspect of the right of a patentee to sell his articles with
restrictions on their use. Complainants manufactured certain
machines for fastening buttons to shoes with metallic fasteners
and sold them on condition that thiy should be used only with
fasteners manufactured by them, title to revert upon breach of
condition. The result was that complainants acquired the
monopoly of the manufacture and sale of an unpatented article
(the fastener itself), as their machine had superseded all others of
the kind. Defendants manufactured and sold to the users of
these machines fasteners intended to be used therein.
The court held that the buyers, as regards their right to use
the machines, were mere licensees, and any use contrary to the
condition would be not only a breach of contract but also an in-
fringement (Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788-go), and therefore
it must follow that defendants were contributory infringers,
as they were intentional aiders and abettors of the buyers. The
same principle is here involved as in the intentional making and
selling a necessary element of a combination patent (Wallace v.
Holmes, 9 Blatchf. 65). But the real distinction between this
case and that of Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrap-
ping Paper Co., t52 U. S. 425, where the sale of rolls of paper
(unpatented) adapted and intended to be used with complainants'
mechanism for delivering them was held not to be an infringe-
ment, is that here an express contract of restriction was made.
The court also held that the condition was not void either as
in restraint of trade or against public policy. That a monopoly of
an unpatented article so created was only an incidental and
therefore a legitimate result of complainants' lawful use of their
monopoly of a patent; its life and extent would depend entirely
on the merits of the patent. This case is essentially different
from the telephone cases-State v. Bell Tel. Co., 23 Fed. 539, and
Stale v. Del. & A. Tel. & Tel. Co., 47 Fed. 633, Id. 5o Fed. 677-
where similar restrictions were held void, as telephone companies
are charged with public duties and subject to regulation by law.
The question whether electric light companies are contem-
plated under the term "manufacturing industries," where such
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industries are exempted from municipal taxation by the State
Legislature was considered by the Court of Appeals of Maryland
in the case of the Frederick City Electric Light and Power Co. v.
Mayer, etc., of Frederick Ciy, et al., 36 At. Rep. 362. On Febru-
ary 4, z891, the Mayor and Aldermen of Frederick passed an ordi-
nance providing that the machinery and apparatus of all manu-
facturing industries established within the corporate limits of the
city within a certain period from the passage of the ordinance
should be exempt from taxation for a number of years. Whether
an electric company could properly be said to "manufacture"
electricity is immaterial. An ordinary, non-scientific citizen, such
as. the mayor and aldermen presumably were, in speaking of the
advantages of his town would mention that it was lighted by elec-
tricity, but would scarcely include an electric plant among its
"manufacturing industries." It could not be seriously contended
that an electric plant connected with a private residence or a hotel
should be exempt from taxation as a "manufacturing industry."
The purpose. of the ordinance was declared to be to encourage
manufacturing industries to locate in the town, and there was no
need of the advantage of exemption from taxation to induce an
electric light company to locate in a place the size of Frederick.
Where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a certain concern
was intended to be exempted from taxation, the doubt must be
resolved in favor of the taxing power (60 Md. 280). The case
of People v. Wrenle, 129 N. Y. 543, 29 N. E. 8o8, held such con-
cerns to be within the exemption of "manufacturing corpora-
tions;" but O'Brien, J., said, "the policy of the law must be
considered, and should have great weight," and the legislature
subsequently declared that they should not thereafter be deemed
to be within the exemption. The case of Com. v. Varthern Electric
Light &- Power Co., 145 Pa. 105, 22 Atl. 839, was also decided by
the same principle.
The force of the much discussed South Carolina Dispensary
Act has been so largely destroyed by the recent decision of the
Supreme court, in the case of Scott v. Donald, that the statute is
now practically a nullity. The case is an important one, as it
raises a constitutional question, the difficulty of which is shown
by the frequent and numerous dissenting opinions in the many
cases where similar questions have been considered. In the pres-
ent case Mr. Justice Brown renders a strong dissenting opinion.
The case was brought to recover damages for the action of the
defendant, a state constable, of South Carolina, in seizing, in
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accordance with the Dispensary Act, several packages of wines
and liquors belonging to the plaintiff and at the time of seizure in
possession of a railway company which had brought the packages
within the state. In reviewing the judgment of the United
States Circuit Court, the Supreme Court holds that a state cannot
prevent the private importation of spirituous liquors from another
state, so long as it continues to recognize them as articles of law-
ful consumption and commerce. The ground upon which the
court condemns those provisions of the statute affecting the plain-
tiff, is that they constitute an interference with interstate com-
merce. It is important to notice that the statute does not pro-
hibit either the importation, manufacture or sale of intoxicating
liquors; it merely turns these operations over to the state.
Therefore the Supreme Court insists that such liquors must be re-
garded as the subject of foreign and interstate commerce, and
that it is the duty of the Federal courts to afford such commerce
the same measure of protection as is given to other articles of
trade. By permitting only the state to import, IIthose citizens
who wish to use foreign wines and liquors are deprived of the
exercise of their own judgment and taste in the selection of
commodities."
The main ground upon which the defense sought to justify the
statute was as an inspection act, and the act does, indeed, contain
provisions looking to the ascertainment of the purity of liquors,
but they do not redeem it from the charge of being an obstruction
to commerce. In disposing of this point, the court upholds Min-
nesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, and a large list of other cases in-
volving questions of interstate commerce.
Mr. Justice Brown, in his dissenting opinion, considers the
rulings in Minnesota v. Barber as having no considerable bearing
upon the question; and contends that inasmuch as public senti-
ment favors some restriction of the sale of ardent spirits, the
question of whether such restriction shall take the form of a
license upon dealers, the total prohibition of the manufacture, or
the assumption by the state government of the power to supply
liquors, is a matter exclusively for the state to determine.
